Abstract. Through a conceptual framework that combines the English School's focus on primary institutions in international society with the Copenhagen School's theory of securitization and desecuritization, this article studies the Europeanization of national minorities. It thus signals a categorical departure from the dominant norms transfer approach to problems of national minorities in the European Union (EU), an approach that has failed to convincingly account for many minority outcomes of European integration. This is particularly true of the continual att achment of national minorities to the state's security agenda. The article takes Galbreath and McEvoy's (2012) hypothesis that the EU has a unique potential to desecuritize national minorities, and applies it to one candidate (Macedonia) and one new member state (Bulgaria). It assesses fl ashpoints of minority/majority tensions across several sectors (the judiciary, the police, public administration, political representation, education, and health care). The investigation ascertains negative outcomes-desecuritization-but points to the crisis of confi dence in the primary institution of European integration (supranationality) and the ensuing consolidation of nationalism as the dominant institution of pre-EU European society. The article concludes that improved minority/majority relations are a possible consequence of Europeanization rather than a precondition for it.
Introduction
The problématique of national minorities 1 and European integration has traditionally been studied through a top-down approach that focuses on legal and policy convergence and formal compliance with EU minority norms and institutions. 2 But the assumption that minority protection is an essential element of EU membership (and preparation for membership, as inscribed into enlargement conditionality) has only highlighted the discrepancy between norm/policy adoption and their outcomes when it comes to national minorities in and around the EU. It has diverted att ention from the complex relationship between shifting notions of sovereignty within the EU and minority/majority relations, and has prevented a more in-depth investigation of Europeanization's impact on national minorities' positions, not necessarily (but especially) in its external dimension. Only very recently have challenges against such an 'EUcentric' approach started to mount, directing academic inquiry to the need for a thorough rethinking of the framework for studying national minorities and Europeanization. 3 The purpose of this article is to join academic eff ort in responding to this need. The key argument here is that Europeanization's (potential) impact on minority/majority relations should not be overlooked, but that it is best understood outside the logic of conditionality. The article proposes shifting the focus of inquiry from the content of the specifi c norms and practices that constitute EU minority regulation to the structural opportunities provided by Europeanization for transforming the zero-sum logic of minority/majority relations. These structural opportunities are carried by the supranational norms, rules, institutions, narratives, and practices that constitute the context of Europeanization. They may not relate directly to minorities, and they may not even be fully adopted (EU applicant states are at various stages of adapting to the acquis communautaire, and even member states transpose and implement EU rules diff erently). What this article argues is that this context should be considered when studying minority/majority relations because it profoundly changes their normative basis.
The article builds this claim by combining the methodological tools of two conceptual frameworks: the English School's normative focus on raison de système and the notion of primary institutions, 4 and the Copenhagen School's theory of securitization and desecuritization. 5 The invaluable relevance of the English School to this study of Europeanization and minorities is that it prompts us to 2 Cf. Heather Grabbe, The EU's Transformative Power. focus on the systemic level and on the institutions that govern its logic. Such a focus is often neglected when Europeanization is understood as an impact rather than as the source of and the structural conditions for that impact. 6 But if we refer to one of the most widely recognized defi nitions of Europeanizationthe emergence of distinct supranational governance structures 7 -it is clear that the focus is, indeed, the systemic level and the changes in the institutions that govern it. Thus factoring in the systemic level seems indispensable to studying Europeanization. Students of European integration have dedicated an immense intellectual eff ort to outlining and examining an array of supranational governance structures within their national modalities of adoption and compliance. What the English School's focus on the systemic level can supplement these eff orts with, is a conceptual and normative framework for understanding the broader structural context of the radical change European integration represents within international society (in the English School vernacular). The primary institutions of international society without Europeanization have been sovereignty, nationalism, and human rights. 8 The advent of European integration dramatically challenged all three of them. Because minority/majority relations are tightly linked to interpretations of sovereignty, nationalism, and rights, they are inevitably aff ected. Seen from within the fl uid social structure of an international society with changing primary institutions, the security analysis of minority/majority relations acquires a much more fi ne-grained conceptual and normative framework. 9 This article starts from the observation that minority/majority relations have inevitably become entangled in the nation-state's security strategies and security agendas. National minorities in Europe have, over time, been linked to 'hard' national security concerns (through their aspirations for territory, demands for political autonomy, and claims for cultural independence), as well as to wider 'soft' security concerns (such as political representation and participation, access to economic opportunities, societal cohesion, cultural heritage, and collective identity). This broad (sectoral and thematic) security problématique has been uniquely captured by the Copenhagen School's multifaceted conceptualization 6 I have argued elsewhere that our defi nition of Europeanization can have a profound eff ect on understanding its implications, and that divergent defi nitions of Europeanization have in particular marked the disciplinary divide between internal and external Europeanization cf. Nevena Nancheva / Cvete Koneska of threats. 10 But beyond that, the Copenhagen School is especially relevant to the study of security and minorities because of its key methodological contribution to security analysis: the theory of (de)securitization. By highlighting the dynamics of securitization ('the process by which groups of people construct something as a threat' 11 ) and the process of desecuritization ('the move of an issue out of the sphere of security' 12 ), the Copenhagen School theorists have opened, for an array of minority-minded security experts, a challenging research agenda. Among this agenda's primary concerns have been interrogating the taken-for-granted link between national security and national minorities, and the possibility of removing minorities from the nation-state's security agenda.
Combining the theory on primary institutions in international society (raison de système) with (de)securitization theory's understanding of what constitutes national security (raison d'état) seems to provide an invaluable theoretical framework for analyzing European integration's impact on minority/majority relations. Applied in 2012 to the study of the EU's impact on national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, 13 (de)securitization theory suggested that Europeanization might off er a unique normative opportunity to detach the issue of national minority regulation from the high-security agenda that has governed European minority/majority relations. This is because the EU can 'reconstruct' the narratives of 'benefi t and belonging' at diff erent social and political levels and push for 'empowerment over protection' through its system of multilevel governance. 14 Galbreath and McEvoy explore the potential for a reconstructivist strategy of desecuritization within the EU but neither examine in detail the systemic reasons for this nor investigate specifi c national narrative contexts. This is precisely what the current article aims to address.
Taking up Galbreath and McEvoy's hypothesis on the EU's desecuritization potential, the article examines two national contexts spanning the external-internal Europeanization dynamics that have traditionally divided the study of the EU's impact on minority regulation. 15 These two contexts are Macedonia (an EU candidate state) and Bulgaria (a member state). These two states' diff erent 10 Even as it has not exhausted, as is often presumed, the methodological, conceptual, and normative complexity of the (analysis of) security provision. types of engagement with the structural context of Europeanization are meant to highlight basic diff erences and open an agenda for further research. The case studies aim to demonstrate how (if at all) Europeanization's norms, narratives, and institutional practices have been engaged recently around fl ashpoints of minority/majority tensions in the two countries. The outcomes in terms of intergroup relations, as the case studies below reveal, point to unaff ected or reinforced securitization rather than to desecuritization. This is rather discouraging in terms of Galbreath and McEvoy's hypothesis on the EU's desecuritization potential, but it does not immediately invalidate it.
To bett er understand the unexpected securitization and absence of desecuritization at the national level, this article looks to the systemic level. Its focus is the structural context of Europeanization itself (rather than the contents of specifi c minority norms or their formal modes of transfer). The article engages with the ways Europeanization transforms (or fails to transform) narratives and practices around minority-relevant norms and concerns. What the analysis suggests is weakness in the processes of Europeanization around specifi c policy areas (for example, antiterrorist security measures) and uncertainty in the normative relevance of Europeanization in the implementation of specifi c norms (for example, norms granting group-specifi c rights). These have disrupted the key EU primary institution (supranationality and its normative detachment from nationalism 16 ), thus either subverting the relevance of narratives of supranational 'benefi ts and belonging' or harnessing narratives of supranationality for the purposes of nationalist political agendas. The weakness and uncertainty of Europeanization as a fl uid structural context undergoing multiple crises of legitimacy, effi ciency, and relevance have reinforced the normative power of primary institutions characterizing an international society without European integration. The employment of nationalist-populist political strategies to justify tense majority/minority relations is an indication of this, as are resistance to specifi c supranational initiatives (asylum governance, not studied here) and noncompliance with existing supranational policies and rules (around the common market, the common currency, and treaty rights, not studied here either). The ambiguity with which the European project has responded to such challenges to its raison d'être has seriously disrupted supranationality as a primary institution. This needs to be taken into account when assessing how EU membership preparation and accession impact on (de)securitizing national minorities. It is, in this sense, more useful to think of improving minority/majority relations as a possible consequence of Europeanization rather than as a condition for it.
The rest of the article proceeds in two sections. The fi rst section, '(De)Securitizing Minorities in the EU', engages with the literature on the relationship between national minorities and the EU, introduces the conceptual history of the securitization perspective in studying minorities, and presents the article's method and argument. The second section, 'Investigating the Sources of Securitization', contains the empirical work. It looks for fl ashpoints of minority/ majority tensions across several sectors-the judiciary, the police and security agencies, the civil service, political representation, education, and emergency health care-in Macedonia (a candidate state) and Bulgaria (a new member state). The analysis seeks both to identify the mechanisms of engaging or avoiding the narratives, norms, and practices of Europeanization and to assess the outcomes of this engagement in enabling the desecuritization of minorities.
(De)Securitizing Minorities in the EU
It has been argued that the EU has been concerned with issues of regional stability and migration rather than with minority rights as such in its external role as a change agent in minority protection. 17 That EU institutions only actively engaged with minority regulation after the instability in the Balkans, 18 and then got caught up in the normative dynamics generated by external norm promotion, seems to support this view. The consistent securitization of migration to Europe, which has taken ever greater political priority during the past two decades, 19 also lends credibility to the idea that the EU has been concerned more with preventing instability-driven migration through institutionalizing minority protection than with protecting minorities per se. The numerous linkages between policies towards minorities and migrants 20 suggest that the by now institutionalized securitization of migration in the EU might have aff ected minority policies and discourses more than has been acknowledged.
The Hypothesis: National Minorities and (De)Securitization
Studying national minorities through security analysis, specifi cally through securitization theory, is not new. Over a decade ago now, the pages of Security Dialogue started a vivid debate on the inevitability of securitizing national mi-norities. The debate touched on the link between security and identity, which seemed central to understanding national minority regulation. Referring to the Copenhagen School's conceptualization of societal security as concern with the integrity of a presupposed community 21 and Jef Huysmans' conceptualization of deconstruction strategies, 22 Paul Roe argued in 2004 that minority rights are logically impossible to desecuritize. 23 Because they are predicated on the ethnonational diff erence of the minority community as a primary identity marker, they 'belong to [societal] security', 24 which is refl ected in the threat they are seen to pose to the integrity of the titular majority community in the nation-state. This is a rather pessimistic view because it suggests that minorities can never be regulated within the 'established rules of the [political] game', that they perpetually remain an issue 'above normal politics'. 25 Matt i Jutila was the fi rst to convincingly engage with and challenge this gloomy conclusion. 26 Jutila recognized that national minorities were particularly easy to securitize in contemporary Europe because of nationalism's primary role in constructing minority and majority identities and in formulating their demands. 27 Juxtaposing societal security to state security, national minorities constantly subvert the central claim of nationalism ('one nation, one state') and thus challenge the very structure of European international society. Albeit very diffi cult in practice, however, Jutila argued, the desecuritization of national minorities was still logically possible. Pointing to the multilayered narrativity of collective identities and their non-fi xed nature, Jutila identifi ed a so-called reconstructivist strategy of desecuritization, 28 which picked up the identity narratives that enabled securitization in the fi rst place and reconstructed them in an inclusive, non-antagonistic manner. The goal was to renarrate minority identities as part of the political community of the state, not as its constitutive Other. Jutila linked his conceptualization of minority desecuritization to the policies of multiculturalism (pointing to Kymlicka 29 ). But given the many problems identifi ed in the 21 practice of multiculturalism (e.g. consolidating group diff erences and group borders 30 ), perhaps it is easier to allow for various avenues for desecuritization: Lene Hansen speaks of stabilization, replacement, rearticulation, and silencing as possible forms that the process might take. 31 Rumelili conceptualizes the possibility of desecuritization within a distinction between ontological security (concerned with the being and identity of the national collectivities) and physical security (concerned with the sovereignty and survival of the state). 32 He argues that breaking the security continuum is possible, thus indirectly breathing optimism into the project of desecuritizing national minorities. In any case, the link between renarrating collective identities and the possibility of (de)securitizing national minorities has been consistently reaffi rmed.
From the pages of Security Dialogue again, David Galbreath and Joanne McEvoy brought the debate on the (de)securitization of national minorities to Europeanization by exploring how the EU (among other organizations) transforms minority outcomes. 33 Galbreath and McEvoy argued that of all the European organizations that regulate national minorities, the EU was uniquely positioned to launch and oversee successful desecuritization. The key to its success were its narratives of regional integration and common interests, which had the potential to transform the zero-sum logic of minority/majority relations within the nation-state into non-zero-sum logic. 34 Furthermore, as Galbreath and McEvoy argued, the EU can more successfully push, through its multilevel governance structure, to empower (rather than protect) national minorities, which has been widely identifi ed as the principal omission of existing minority regulation in Europe. 35 Indeed, students of minority regulation in the EU point to the vast potential that primary and secondary EU law changes of the recent decade have opened for promoting minority rights and improving minority positions. 36 zation, however, even the authors' own fi ndings go litt le beyond the theoretical possibility of actual EU achievements in desecuritizing minority/majority relations. 37 This article aims to advance the debate on the (de)securitization of national minorities within the realm of Europeanization in three ways: by combining the Copenhagen School's conceptual frame of (de)securitization theory with the English School's focus on primary institutions in international society and applying it to the study of national minorities in the EU; by investigating the mechanisms of engagement or avoidance of Europeanization's norms, narratives, and practices in the dynamics of securitization of national minorities; and by looking for opportunities for desecuritization.
The Argument. The Role of the EU
Modern att empts to adapt national sovereignty's normative basis of legitimacy to the national diversity of political communities within the state have perpetually hit the normative limit of nation-state politics and nationalism as a primary institution of the European international structure. 38 European states' decades-long disengagement from minority regulation 39 illustrates this point, as does postcommunist states' resistance to substantive minority reforms. 40 Roe's argument about the pre-given condition of securitization of minority rights, however, does not address Europeanization, and this is where this article picks it up. Europeanization radically challenges the normative logic of nation-state politics by off ering, for the fi rst time in modern history, a new, multilevel model for the exercise of sovereignty. The EU is based on the primary institution of supranationality and its subsidiarity principles. The polity that the integration project gradually created sources its legitimacy not from a national community but from a supranational one, one that comprises a variety of titular nations, national minorities, and ethnonational groups. Unlike national sovereignty, where power is exercised within political units demarcated on the basis of nationhood, supranationality transcends the structurally defi ning role of nationhood and pools sovereignty. By breaking the link between nationhood and political power, Europeanization opens up new possibilities for redefi ning the unequal position of national minorities as minorities in view of the exercise of political power by the titular majority. Sovereignty-and, with it, rights-cease to be defi ned exclusively by nationhood and national borders. 41 Within the EU, the permanent opposition between national minorities and titular majorities in restating their claims on state resources (legal rights, social benefi ts, educational opportunities, access to the 'good life', and so forth) can begin to lose relevance. And this is precisely where European integration's potential to transform minority/majority relations-in other words, to desecuritize them-lies. This is not to say that Europeanization automatically enables equality for national minorities or that Europeanization immediately detaches national minorities from the nation-state's security agenda. But it is important to understand that the predicate that makes national minorities' and titular majorities' legitimacy claims always-already mutually exclusive is no longer necessarily valid within the logic of Europeanization. Even before a nation-state accedes to the EU, it can transfer sovereignty outside and beyond its national political community, and in this way already begin to transform ways of thinking and narratives of belonging within it. This needs to be accounted for. 42 Europeanization has introduced an alternative discursive fi eld, one that challenges national sovereignty and grants legitimacy to a diff erent political structure for the exercise of political power. The very presence of this alternative discursive fi eld initiates a radical systemic change that aff ects the system's primary institutions, institutions that determine the dynamics of minority/majority relations. Beyond accession, the functioning of the EU can add so many new levels, checks, and opportunities to national politics 43 that national minorities and the problems of 41 Of course, this argument applies to nationals of EU member states and potentially to those of applicant states. Third country nationals' rights have been very clearly defi ned on the basis of nationhood. Cf inequality associated with them should no longer be constrained by the limits of nation-state sovereignty and its normative logic.
Most recent academic research on national minorities and Europeanization has begun to recognize this. 44 Students of European national minorities now study not only how legislation and policies are implemented but also the transformative eff ects of informal rules and practices. 45 Europe is seen as 'a venue for leadership, discourse and policy action', 46 where formal and informal domestic actors engaged with minority outcomes treat Europe as a resource for domestic political action. 47 The eff ects for policy and regulation changes at the EU level of such action form the empirical fi eld of the so-called bott om-up approaches that have mostly challenged the domination of EU-centric perspectives. 48 Although popular support for integration is waning and although anti-European agendas are rising across the EU, the normative fundament of the Europeanization project, together with its eff orts in formalizing a minority rights regime, has provided an opportunity structure for improving national minority outcomes. National minority activists have increasingly taken advantage of that for the benefi t of the communities they represent. 49 Improving national minority outcomes within a governance structure that transcends national sovereignty and that sources its legitimacy from shared interests rather than from nationhood seems to off er a long-term solution to the inequalities suff ered by minorities. At the same time, the zero-sum implications of compromising national sovereignty by sharing it with minorities begin to lose their dramatic quality when seen from the perspective of sovereignty transfers to the supranational level. This is what suggests a possibility for desecuritizing minority/majority relations within the realm of Europeanization, and is what the analysis that follows will att empt to probe in specifi c empirical contexts of minority/majority tensions. The supranational structure introduced by Europeanization has in no way supplanted the normative imperatives of nationalism 44 in making sense of nation-state politics. 50 But it has provided an alternative discursive fi eld within which minority demands gain legitimacy and nationalist concerns appear less relevant. It is in the interplay between these two fi elds (the raison de système and the raison d'état in the English School) that the dynamics of (de)securitization of minority/majority relations will be examined.
The cases discussed in the next section investigate the mechanisms of this interplay by looking for fl ashpoints of minority/majority tensions across several sectors in two national contexts (table 1). The analysis establishes that negative outcomes in minority/majority relations are linked to two main mechanisms: fi rst, borrowing from the systemic level of EU politics legitimate narrative elements that are subsequently employed in advancing nationalist political agendas; and, second, mechanically translating the security logic of nation-state politics into the language of Europeanization without regard to the specifi c normative diff erence of the EU project, in line with what Karolewski and Suszycki describe as EU 'nationalism light'. 51 Investigating the interplay between the normative fi elds of Europeanization and nationalism in governing minority/majority relations in specifi c national contexts seems promising because it provides a much more fi ne-grained conceptual framework for understanding the changing logic of intergroup relations. Applying this conceptual framework reveals a dynamic that continues to place national minorities on the state's security agenda, despite supranationality's primacy within the realm of Europeanization. Minorities are continuously inscribed into security, whether as threatening national integrity, sovereignty, or culture, or even titular citizens and the national community as a whole. Even though European integration has enjoyed many formal successes in upholding a minority rights regime, minority/majority relations have not necessarily improved. That both the EU candidate state and the new member state studied here display instances of reinforced securitization rather than desecuritization suggests that it makes litt le sense to think of improving minority/majority relations through EU conditionality and the transfer of EU-centric minority norms. Instead, the conceptual framework employed here enables us to highlight the political rhetoric and practices that need to be addressed if desecuritizing national minorities is to become possible. It may thus prove useful in harnessing Europeanization's potential to desecuritize minority/majority relations by identifying the narrative avenues that have led to their securitization. 50 Cf. Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism, London 1995. 51 Ireneusz Paweł Karolewski / Andrzej Marcin Suszycki, eds, The Nation and Nationalism in Europe. An Introduction, Edinburgh 2011, 186.
Investigating the Sources of Securitization
The analysis engages with fl ashpoints of minority/majority tensions in Macedonia and Bulgaria of the recent fi ve years. It is based on process tracing, and discourse and content analysis of offi cial statements. Outcomes are compared in terms of publicly aired perceptions of ontological and existential security threat by both minority and majority group representatives, selected in the analyzed cases on the basis of higher degree of publicity and source authority. The investigation conditionally divides the cases into two groups (this is the fi rst column in Table 1 above). The fi rst group bett er illustrates a mechanism of securitization whereby narratives and institutional practices of Europeanization are borrowed and engaged in the dynamics of intergroup relations and employed in advancing ostensibly nationalist agendas. The second group is more illustrative of another mechanism of securitization: using the status quo of minority/majority relations within the political community of the nation-state to justify policies and practices that presumably aim to advance legitimate state and minority concerns but that ultimately reinforce inequality and segregation within the context of Europeanization. 
Europeanization as a Source of Securitization
Europeanization has been engaged in the securitization of minority/majority relations as a source of legitimate narratives and practices that can be employed in advancing nationalist platforms and agendas. In the cases presented below, securitizing national minorities within the functioning of the state's institutional structure (the judiciary, police, and civil service) has been aided by Europe-wide processes perceived either as an integral element of all-European cooperation (e.g. combating radical Islamic terrorism) or as an integral element of Europeanization itself (e.g. ensuring institutional representation for national minorities in line with EU commitment to promoting minority rights).
The powerful us-vs-them narratives that have sprung from the global war on terror have negatively impacted on intergroup relations in political communities such as Macedonia and Bulgaria that comprise Muslim groups in minority positions (Macedonia and Bulgaria have large Albanian and Turkish minorities respectively). Both states have histories of interethnic tensions and confl ict, so securitizing Islam by linking it to radical acts of political violence across Europe (and the globe) has been refl ected in that, and appears to have been employed for nationalist political contest.
In Macedonia, an incident that illustrates these tensions and their long-term implications is a widely publicized criminal case: the murder, in April 2012, of fi ve Macedonian men by ethnic Albanians. A series of minor interethnic incidents in the months preceding the murder had not had the same repercussions. 52 But the severity of this crime captured antagonistic narratives between the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority, straining minority/majority relations for years after the incident. 53 Att empts were made initially not to frame the event in ethnoreligious terms. For example, the head of Macedonia's Journalists' Association, Naser Selmani, called on journalists to exercise utmost caution in reporting the incident to avoid 'inciting inter-ethnic violence'. 54 He was originally joined by Minister of the Interior Gordana Yankulovksa, who called for calm amidst mass protests demanding retribution. 55 Immediately 52 Florian Bieber, Macedonia on the Brink, OpenDemocracy, 28 July 2014, htt ps://www. opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/fl orian-bieber/macedonia-on-brink. 53 Bieber, Macedonia on the Brink; Ljubica Spaksovska, From Feudal Socialism to Feudal Democracy -The Trials and Tribulations of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Open Democracy Net, 23 July 2014, htt ps://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/ ljubica-spaskovska/from-feudal-socialism-to-feudal-democracy-trials-and-tribulati. 54 Ubijcite pukaa vrz mirot i idninata na Makedonija, Nova Makedonija, 17 April 2012, htt p:// www.dnevnik.mk/default.asp?ItemID=2C092AD850564345B8256BC8F1A08810. thereafter, however, the investigation claimed a link between the perpetrators and the organized arms trade, the dissemination of radical propaganda, and illegal transnational networks. From then onwards, the murders were framed as an act of radical Islamic terrorism, even though some Macedonians actively protested, on behalf of the Albanian community, against such framing. Yankulovska changed her original stance, claiming the 'day of the murders has not been selected randomly', while the victims (four young men between the ages of 18 and 20, and a man of 45) become consistently referred to as 'our boys'. 56 It is beyond the interest of this article to investigate the political mechanisms that led to this change. What should be highlighted, however, is that the power response of the Macedonian authorities in ensuring retributive justice was served, tapped into Europe-wide antiterrorism narratives and practices without necessarily having the legal case for it. Islamic terrorism ultimately dominated reporting on the event and was confi rmed in the verdict issued at the end of a trial, even though observers point to biases revealed in 'closed session court hearings […] predominantly relying on the unsubstantiated claims of a protected witness'. 57 Ali Ahmeti, the head of the Albanian junior coalition party, Democratic Union for Integration (Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim / Demokratska unija za integracija, DUI), even publicly called for an independent retrial. Beyond the actual criminal substance of the case, that it could mobilize such long-term identity-maintenance practices on both the minority and the majority sides indicates a critical intergroup fault line in the political community of the state. The protests and counterprotests-organized along ethnonational lines and often leading to violence-that accompanied the criminal investigation and the court proceedings demonstrate that the terrorism narratives impacted very negatively on intergroup relations. That these narratives were sourced from European antiterrorism cooperation seems to have reinforced their legitimacy and to have further strained minority/majority relations. D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B6%D0%B5-%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D1%83%D0%B1 %D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BE-%D0%B5-%D0%BC%D0%B 5%D1%93%D1%83%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%BA%D0%B8-%D0% BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%84%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%BA%D1%82/a-15883400?maca=maz-rss-maz-pol_makedonija_timemk-4727-xml-mrss. 56 Interpol se vkluchuva vo postragata po osomnichenite za masakrot, Nova Makedonija, 3 May 2012, htt p://www.dw.com/mk/%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BF %D0%BE%D0%BB-%D1%81%D0%B5-%D0%B2%D0%BA%D0%BB%D1%83%D1%87%D1%8 3%D0%B2%D0%B0-%D0%B2%D0%BE-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D0% B3%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0-%D0%BF%D0%BE-%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0 %BD%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5-%D0%B7%D0%B0-% D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%82/a-15924345. 57 Roland Gjoni / Shirley Cloyes Dioguardi, Crisis Brewing in Macedonia, OpenDemocracy, 23 September 2014, htt ps://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/roland-gjoni-shirley-cloyes-dioguardi/crisis-brewing-in-macedonia.
A very similar outcome can be observed in Bulgaria, even though it enjoyed far more stable interethnic relations post-communism, 58 and even though it also enjoyed, from 2007 onwards, full EU membership. A large-scale antiterrorism case involving the spiritual leadership of the Muslim community in the town of Pazardzhik (the case against the thirteen imams) gained popularity around the same time. The proceedings, which resonated widely with Muslim communities in the country, culminated in 2014 with all defendants being convicted for belonging to an illegal (Islamic) organization, and with all but three of them being acquitt ed of disseminating radical Islamic (Salafi st) propaganda. The prosecution was widely criticized for having relied too heavily on experts who lacked competence in Islamic theology and who were unable to provide a reliable translation from Arabic. Questions were raised about how evidence had been gathered and about the character of the witnesses. 59 The prosecution justifi ed its case by claiming that 'a grave threat had been posed against the national security and the democratic form of the state'. 60 The outcome of the trial, however, does litt le to show how the national security and the democratic form of the state had been safeguarded: all but one of the imams were released and free to continue preaching because the prosecution could not provide a legal reason against it, ultimately all but dropping its main charges. Given the problematic criminal substance of the charges, launching such a large-scale initiative against local Muslim leaders raises questions. The main justifi cation for it had been antiterrorism measures, in line with Europe-wide trends, but no acts of Islamic terrorism had occurred in Bulgaria. The narrative borrowed from Europeanization legitimated a justice campaign that appeared to lack legal merit. The outcome for minority/majority relations was increased tension. Analysts point to consolidated local support for the tried religious leaders, despite their arguably radical rhetoric and backgrounds, as a result of the anti-Islamic narratives that the trial invoked. A witness recounts their impression as one of 'being tried for being a Muslim'. 61 Parallels have been drawn with communistera repressions against the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria. 62 Chief Secretary of the Mufti Offi ce Ahmed Ahmedov is categorical that the trial 'antagonized people and […] worked against the interests of the state'; 'Muslim people are thinking: "Are they starting again? […] When will I be accused for my beliefs?'''. 63 The ease with which the judiciary could be involved in reinforcing intergroup tensions is a clear indicator of securitization: drawing an issue from the agenda of 'normality' to the level of high security and 'emergency'.
The police are another central actor in this dynamic. Security and law enforcement agencies have strained intergroup relations in postconfl ict Balkan societies. Police in Macedonia have often been accused of ethnonationally biased treatment of Macedonian citizens. Command and communication in the police happen in the Macedonian language, despite the legal amendments of 2011, which have been widely interpreted by Albanians as granting equal status to the Albanian language within the structures of the defence and interior ministries, among others. 64 As a result, Macedonian police have often been accused of using excessive force or engaging in misconduct against members of the Albanian minority. 65 Engaging the police in intergroup strife indicates high levels of securitization of minority/majority relations under the imperatives of ensuring stability and peace. These have also been the priority of EU policies in Macedonia, as evidenced by the EU's involvement in managing the aftermath of the 2001 interethnic confl ict. 66 Stability and peace as security imperatives have thus become closely intertwined with narratives of Europeanization. But while Europeanization's impact (or lack of it) here can be analyzed only within a broader contextualization of Macedonia's EU trajectory, it appears that security practices have had ambivalent eff ects on minority/majority tensions around the work of the Macedonian police.
The work of the Bulgarian State Agency for National Security (Dărzhavna agentsiya 'Natsionalna sigurnost', DANS), whose operations in 2010 were at the heart of the imams' trial, has also been criticized for bias against minorities. In late November 2014, DANS launched a large-scale operation in the Muslim (mostly Roma) neighbourhoods of four towns, with the offi cial purpose of uncovering a reportedly 'dormant cell of Islamic State'. 67 The operation happened at dawn, covering densely populated residential neighbourhoods, and graphic materials recovered from the operation were immediately shared on social media, att racting protests on behalf of the Muslim community. The head of the DANS, Vladimir Pisanchev, later described the operation as 'general prevention'. 68 That it was launched on the basis of 'no specifi c operative information' did lead to his being summoned to a closed-doors hearing in parliament, where his resignation was demanded, but he remained in post. Experts and analysts are almost unanimous in their opinion that the only visible result from DANS's operation was to instil fear and seriously strain relations with Bulgaria's Roma Muslims. 69 This happened against the backdrop of the ultranationalist factions in the Bulgarian parliament (mostly around the Ataka movement) spreading anti-Islamic narratives. But in view of similar processes in most EU member states, no substantial correctives have been established against employing antiterrorism narratives to justify arguable security practices in dealing with Muslim minorities. Europeanization has thus appeared unable to improve minority outcomes.
Another element borrowed from Europeanization, and employed in securitizing national minorities, is the focus on minority representation in state institutions and decision-making. Minority representation is an element of the minority rights regime upheld by the EU. It is therefore both a minorityspecifi c European norm and also part of a supranational regime that represents one dimension of Europeanization (minority protection). How states interpret and implement this norm should thus reveal more about how Europeanization impacts minority/majority relations. In Macedonia, the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) (also closely intertwined with the dynamics of Europeanization 70 ) addresses the problem of Albanian under-representation in the public administration in its Section 4. The OFA's target of equitability was seen to be 25% (approximately in line with the proportion of the Albanian minority population). Applying the criterion of equitable representation only formally, however, produced a contentious outcome: as Vice Prime Minister Musa Xhaferi openly admitt ed, an unspecifi ed number of Albanians employed in the public administration received wages but had no real job. 71 It has been pointed out that nominally increasing the number of Albanians in the civil service (from 3-4% in 2001 to 18-20% in 2011) has been turned into 'a mechanism for the employment of unqualifi ed party activists and soldiers'. 72 The so-called framework payouts contributed to the perception that OFA public sector representation arrangements had failed. 73 That no other minorities benefi ted from the arrangements suggests the instrumental implementation of narratives and practices of inclusion 'borrowed' from Europeanization to advance a power-sharing agenda that served the participating ethnonational elites but not the minority those elites represented. The formal implementation of a minority norm, brokered by the EU as it was, and characteristic of the EU minority rights regime, does not seem to have substantively improved minority/majority relations.
In Bulgaria, instrumentally engaging with the imperative of minority inclusion in public decision-making and institutional representation produced a similar outcome for the Roma minorities. Recognizing the endemic quality of Roma segregation and discrimination, Bulgaria set up a governmental body, the National Council for Cooperation on Ethnic and Integration Issues (Natsionalen săvet za sătrudnichestvo po ethnicheskite i integratsionnite văprosi, NCCEII) and hosted in Sofi a the launch of a large-scale European strategy (Decade for Roma Inclusion, 2005-2015) together with eleven other EU member and candidate states. The eff orts in preparing a national strategy for integrating the Roma (2012-2020) within the framework of Bulgaria's EU membership indicate that combating Roma segregation was seen as normatively imperative. But beyond the laudable rhetoric, NCCEII struggled to include the Roma. Thirteen leading Roma political parties and activist organizations walked out of the NCCEII in 2013 after their requests for administrative restructuring and regulatory reforms were repeatedly ignored. Over the following months the head of the NCCEII (and vice prime minister), Zinaida Zlatanova, refused all contact with them. After she failed to show up at a national monitoring conference for the implementation of the National Strategy for Roma Inclusion in December 2013, the thirty-fi ve participating Roma activists also left the event and headed for the Ministerial Council building, where they demanded to speak to Zlatanova. The incident developed in absurd tones, with the dissenting Roma activists 'occupying' the building for several hours until they negotiated a meeting through intermediar-ies, as Zlatanova was reportedly reluctant to meet them in person and as a group. Even so, the meeting did litt le to ease disagreements, as Zlatanova insisted that she 'would only work with the Roma within the format of the National Council' and, unless they rejoined it, she 'would fi nd other Roma activists willing to work with her'. 74 While occurring within a nominally representative body, the power struggle taken up by the vice prime minister contributed to Bulgaria's failure to co-opt Roma leaders and break the cycle of the Roma community's chronic lack of representation. It points to a dynamic within which the EU narrative is borrowed without regard to its normative contents and aims. Rather, the opportunity for minority representation and participation off ered in the body of the Council was used to reinforce the majority's power position in dictating the terms of minority/majority relations. 75 This subsection has highlighted minority-relevant problem areas, policies, and practices that appear not to have benefi ted from Europeanization, in that minority/majority relations have not improved. We observe either new avenues for securitization (the Islamic terrorism narratives and antiterrorism policies) or reinforced securitization (the bias of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies against minorities) or a lack of desecuritization despite minority-specifi c norms pertaining to Europeanization having been adopted (minority representation arrangements and participation bodies). The observations indicate that minority/majority relations have not improved within the context of Europeanization and that elements of Europeanization itself seem to have been employed in securitizing national minorities.
Nationalism as a Source of Securitization
Another mechanism of securitization revealed by the investigation captures the reverse dynamic: translating the logic of nation-state politics to the EU level. The cases below, touching on problems of political representation, education, and health care, demonstrate that whenever the engagement of national minorities refl ected the primacy of national security and nation-state integrity, or treated minorities as a dangerous colle ctivity within the state, Europeanization not only did not improve minority/majority relations; it often seemed to reinforce existing tensions. 74 Purva romska okupacia na Ministerski suvet, Obektiv 216, 18 December 2013, htt p:// www.bghelsinki.org/bg/publikacii/obektiv/obektiv/2013-12/prva-romska-okupaciya-na-ministerskiya-svet/. 75 The Roma minority's situation is further complicated by the specifi c long-term context of segregation and discrimination that has determined Roma position in European states, but also from the fact that the Roma are not a national minority in the strict sense of the word (they do not have a titular state). I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.
The Macedonian OFA's key focus on maintaining and preserving the integrity of the state has, as analysts have observed, to a large extent impeded substantial implementation of minority rights per se. 76 It has, instead, simply cemented a power-sharing deal between ethnic party elites 77 perceived as 'sultan-parties'. 78 Besides the Albanians, no other minorities have benefi ted from the reforms. 79 What is more, a rift has opened up between the ruling elites and their publics, 80 suggesting that minority outcomes on the ground are not seen as adequately pursued at the level of state politics. This is visible, for example, in the coalition government's resistance to allowing other political actors to represent the Albanian minority: DUI's Ali Ahmeti's position is that 'a third Albanian party would fracture the Albanian vote'. 81 The large-scale scandal involving longstanding wiretapping practices by the government only show the extents to which the coalition government had entrenched its positions in dealing with the opposition 'at any cost'. 82 But even before the scandal, the OFA's power-sharing arrangement had been assessed as defi cient ('a dead man awaiting his burial' 83 ). The OFA's failure to establish a sustainable route to minority representation refl ects its central concern with the stability and integrity of the sovereign state. The gradual loss of hopes for progress on the EU membership agenda has only reinforced the lack of an alternative model for the exercise of sovereign power.
The role of Bulgaria's Turkish minority party, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi, DPS), as a perpetual veto player in the forming of governments has also often been criticized for att empting to appropriate the minority vote for the benefi t of its own elite. 84 In both Macedonia and Bulgaria the minority/majority power-sharing deals established in diff erent periods of the postcommunist transitions have ultimately benefi ted only one focus minority which had been critical in ensuring the stability and integrity of the state. The growing alienation between the ethnonational elites, whose positions the deals consolidated, and their publics indicates, among other things, that they have had questionable impact on advancing positive outcomes for minority groups and for intergroup relations in general. The imperative of ensuring stability and integrity as primary raison d'état within the nation-state has thus interfered with the systemic logic of supranationality. The minority elite engagement that has followed this logic has not 'trickled down' to members of the minority-or to members of other minorities-and has not removed minority issues from the state's security agenda.
Implementing another European minority rights norm-minorities' right to be educated in their mother tongue-within the constraints of nationalist politics, albeit within the context of Europeanization, has also had very ambivalent results in terms of minority/majority relations. OFA provisions on education (under Section 6) consolidated Albanian 'functional autonomy' in the education sector and de facto reinforced intergroup segregation. Albanian elites vehemently resisted, including by popular mobilization, any att empt to break the segregation-for example, by making the study of the Macedonian language in primary schools compulsory-because they perceived such att empts as encroaching on their rights. 85 Meanwhile, the concern with ethnic intolerance in schools and interethnic youth violence has become ever more pressing. 86 Data from the Macedonian Helsinki Committ ee and the Nansen Dialogue Centre suggest that the majority of the 175 reported hate crimes in 2014 were interethnic and involved underage children, often happening in and around schools. Since 2012 the Macedonian Ministry of Education has implemented a strategy for reducing school violence through, inter alia, integrated education. The education minister, Abdylaqim Ademi, insists that teachers need to be trained to teach in interethnic schools, but the goal of integrated education has so far been impossible to reconcile with the Albanian minority's right to educational autonomy. Interethnic violence in schools has been controlled with the help of the police or through maintaining physical segregation, but no long-term policy solution has so far been found. A possible intergroup cooperation strategy could have been provided through the EU membership preparation route, but accession negotiations have repeatedly been postponed. EU membership, however, is not an automatic solution to segregation and the intergroup tensions linked to it, as a recent case from Bulgaria indicates. After an att ack on medical personnel att ending an emergency call in a Roma neighbourhood in late November 2014, the minister of health services, Petar Moskov, 85 Koneska, After Ethnic Confl ict, 146-152. 86 Lidija Hristova / Aneta Cekik, Discrimination in Macedonia's Multi-Ethnic Society. Perceptions of Inequality among the Student Population, New Balkan Politics 13 (2013), 54-69, htt p://www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/uploads/att achments/3._hristova_and_cekik(1).pdf. stated that no emergency medical att ention would be provided to Roma areas until the safety of the medical personnel in the ambulances had been ensured by police cars. 87 The minister claimed that out of 227 recorded cases of violence against medics, 174 had happened in Roma areas. The Evroroma Party leader, Tsvetelin Kanchev, objected that the roots of the problem were to be sought not in Roma violence but in the purportedly tardy responses of medical teams when called to Roma neighbourhoods. 88 The ensuing public debate on the subject has been rich in antiminority narratives and accusations of racism. The Bulgarian Union of Medical Doctors stood behind the health minister, even as the minister of justice condemned his words as hate speech. Eventually, Moskov partially retracted his statement, but insisted that the segregation of Roma areas was so severe that they were beyond state reach and thus 'extremely dangerous'. This explicit securitization rhetoric, an att empt to justify a political faux pas, reveals the consensual quality of the logic of securitizing the Roma. Analysts point out that Europeanization has eff ectively changed litt le of that, both in Bulgaria and across Europe. 89 The examples in this subsection have highlighted contexts in which the normative logic of nation-state politics is translated to Europeanization, thus (re)producing minority securitization. The emphasis on national integrity and stability when renegotiating intergroup relations (rather than on rights, protection, substantive inclusion, and so forth) has contributed to retaining the high-security marker att ached to minorities' access to political power, without necessarily enhancing eff ective participation (the alienation of ethnonational minority elites from their publics). The same is true of enforcing minority group rights (mother-tongue education) without regard to maintaining access to a shared public space, which is essential in a common political community. The purposeful securitization of minority spaces as zones beyond the responsibility of the state is another example of employing the nation-state logic of legitimation, disregarding the context of Europeanization, and specifi cally its concern with minority integration.
Conclusion
This article has sought to contribute to the debate on the impact of Europeanization on national minority outcomes and minority/majority relations in Europe by combining the Copenhagen School's (de)securitization theory with the English School's notion of primary institutions in international society into a hybrid conceptual framework. The article has applied this framework to minority/majority relations in one EU candidate state (Macedonia) and one new member state (Bulgaria). As specifi c and idiosyncratic as these two national contexts are, they are representative of states involved in (diff erent stages of) Europeanization. Europeanization is understood here as a changing structural context, not as the adoption of 'good' (minority-specifi c, or else) norms and practices. Europeanization implies all that, but it is, before all, the imagining of an international society governed by the primary institution of supranationality. The shift from national sovereignty to supranationality in the systemic logic of Europeanization is what inspired our interest in Europeanization's impact, since minority/majority relations are governed by the rules of sovereignty.
(De)securitization theory has suggested that Europeanization can remove national minorities from the state's security agenda and thus improve minority/ majority relations. Unexpectedly, our analysis has demonstrated that security concerns continue to be tightly intertwined with the handling of national minorities at all political and social levels, escalating to high-security politics the functioning of 'everyday' state structures such as the judiciary, the police, the civil service, political representation, health care, and public education. Rather than improving intergroup relations, Europeanization's narratives, norms, and practices have been engaged in the very dynamics of securitization we expected to see reversed. Minority-relevant narrative elements from the systemic level of EU politics and even specifi c minority rights norms can be borrowed to justify ostensibly antiminority practices or formal minority norm implementation without regard to substantive improvement of minority outcomes. Moreover, when interpreted within the logic of nationalist politics, and in view of the nation-state's security agenda, Europeanization's concern with minority rights consolidates the inequality of minority positions and perpetuates intergroup tensions. The analysis points to negative outcomes for minority/majority relations: continued discrimination, segregation, a lack of representation in institutions, a lack of access to services, benefi ts for one critical minority at the expense of all others, alienation between ethnonational elites and their publics, and the singling out of Muslim national minorities as a security threat.
This confi rms our claim that Europeanization's impact on intergroup relations is to be sought not in the exact content of the minority regulation but in how Europeanization is interpreted and in the normative structure within which Europeanization is implemented. 90 But it also disappoints us because we expected to see improved minority/majority relations and decreasing securitization. Although national minorities occupy a categorically diff erent structural position within the realm of Europeanization, they remain securitized. Keeping a steady eye on the systemic level, as our framework dictates, suggests an explanation in the modalities of Europeanization as a structural change rather than those of minority/majority relations as specifi c cases. The principal advantage of this approach is that it opens a viable research agenda for comparison and investigation. Europeanization introduces a structural change for all involved states. The modalities of involvement imply diff erences. Applicant states are not yet bound by the rules, regulations, and policies of the acquis but do subscribe to the narratives and practices of Europeanization. States implement the acquis and interpret Europeanization diff erently. It is these diff erences-the modalities of involvement-that determine the impact of Europeanization's primary institution. The normative power of supranationality (shared governance, community, and interests) and its relevance to national politics have been aff ected by the crises of confi dence the EU has batt led in the last decade. The logic of national sovereignty and nationalism (as the primary institutions of pre-EU Europe) have been quick to reoccupy the normative vacuum created. In the ensuing interplay between the discursive fi elds of supranationality and national sovereignty described above, national minorities more often than not (are forced to) assume their traditional position within the nation-state, a position of inequality and high security. This outcome does not, however, invalidate Europeanization's claim for normative diff erence of national minorities; it only ascertains its present political weakness and normative uncertainty. However, should the European project emerge from its crisis of confi dence, minority/ majority relations could still be desecuritized. Such a desecuritization is but one possible consequence of Europeanization. 
